

Japan asks for revision of 1996 U.N. report on ‘comfort women’

October 16, 2014

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

The Japanese government asked for a partial revision of a 1996 report on wartime “comfort women” by a United Nations special rapporteur, but the request was immediately rejected.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told an Oct. 16 news conference that the revision request was made to Radhika Coomaraswamy, who compiled the report for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

According to Foreign Ministry officials, Kuni Sato, the Foreign Ministry ambassador in charge of human rights and humanitarian issues, met with Coomaraswamy in New York on Oct. 14 and asked her to revise references to a book written by Seiji Yoshida on how he forcibly took away comfort women from South Korea.

Coomaraswamy, a legal expert from Sri Lanka, refused to change the report, saying the Yoshida reference was only one part of the evidence, according to Suga and Foreign Ministry officials.

In early August, The Asahi Shimbun compiled [a special coverage package](#) of its past reporting on the comfort women issue and concluded that Yoshida’s testimony was a fabrication. Asahi retracted its articles related to testimony by Yoshida.

At his news conference, Suga cited the Asahi’s retraction of the articles as a reason for making the revision request.

“We will persistently explain to the international community, beginning with the United Nations, in order to obtain their understanding,” Suga said at his news conference.

The 1996 U.N. report does not quote from any Asahi article, including those related to Yoshida.

About 300 words in the report are devoted to Yoshida. Clearly stating that the information was taken from Yoshida’s book, the report states that “he confesses to having been part of slave raids in which, among other Koreans, as many as 1,000 women were obtained for ‘comfort women’ duties under the National Labor Service Association as part of the National General Mobilization Law.”

The report also states that historian Ikuhiko Hata refuted what was described in Yoshida’s book.

The 1996 report referred to comfort women as “military sex slaves” and included six recommendations for the Japanese government, such as acknowledging legal responsibility and paying compensation to the victims.

The report was compiled after visits to Japan and South Korea in which former comfort women and researchers were interviewed.

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The **Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea** (Japanese: 日韓基本条約 (Nikkan Kihon Jōyaku[?]); Korean: 한일기본조약, 韓日基本條約, *Hanil Gibon Joyak*) was signed on June 22, 1965. It established basic diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.^[1]

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Background[edit]

As Korea was not a signatory state of the Treaty of San Francisco, It was not entitled to the benefits of Article 14 which stipulates the reparations by Japan. However, by the provisions of Article 21 of the treaty, Korea was entitled to be an authority applied to Article 4 of the treaty which states the arrangement of property and claims.

The Treaty was the fruit of the "Korea–Japan Talks," a series of bilateral talks held between South Korea and Japan from October 1951 to June 1965^[*citation needed*] in order to normalize diplomatic ties. Over that period of 14 years, a total of seven talks were held.^[*citation needed*]

In his 1974 Nobel Peace Prize lecture, Eisaku Sato explicitly mentioned the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea. He described "the guiding spirit of equality and mutual advantage and the realistic approach of seeking to establish friendship with close neighbors" as significant aspects of the extended negotiations which produced this bilateral agreement.^[2]

Treaty provisions[edit]

This diplomatic agreement established "normal" diplomatic relations between two East Asian neighbors. The original documents of this agreement are kept respectively by Japan and Korea. The treaty is drafted using English, Japanese, and Korean, and each is considered authentic. In case of a "divergence of interpretation," the English-language version shall be deemed authoritative and prevailing.^[3]

The 1965 Treaty also declared that:

It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.^[4]

Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims^[edit]



Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation

With the Treaty, the agreements between Japan and Korea concerning the settlement of problems in regard to property and claims and economic cooperation was also signed. Japan provided South Korea with \$300 million grant in economic aid and \$200 million in loans together with \$300 million in loans for private trust, a total of \$800 million as "economic cooperation".^[5] By this Agreement, problems in regard to property and claims between Japan and Korea has been settled completely and finally.

Use of loans and grants^[edit]

The loans and grants provided to South Korea were used for the following projects. **Pohang Iron and Steel Company** used \$88.68 million loan and \$30.8 million grant, a total of \$119.48 million, 23.9% of \$500 million loans and grants.^{[6][7]}

\$200M loans			\$300M grants		
Project	Expense (M\$)	%	Project	Expense (M\$)	%
Construction of Pohang Iron and Steel Company	88.68	44.3	Korea Exchange Bank: Purchase of raw material	132.82	44.2
Construction of Soyang Dam	41.22	20.6	Development of agriculture water	30.84	10.3
Bringing up small business	22.23	11.1	Construction of Pohang Iron and Steel Company	30.80	10.2
Improvement of railway facilities	21.16	10.6	Introduction of fishing vessel	27.17	9.1
Maritime development project	8.17	4.1	Construction of maritime training	13.47	4.5

Construction of Gyeongbu Expressway	7.24	3.6	vessel		
Expansion of long distant telephone service	4.19	2.1	Weather forecast facilities	6.38	2.1
Dredging operation	3.29	1.6	Power transmission and distribution facilities	3.66	1.2
Others	3.82	1.9	Cartography of rural area	3.20	1.1
Total	200.00	100.0	Others	51.66	17.3
			Total	300.00	100.0

Compensation[\[edit\]](#)

There has been a constant call from the South Korean public (and to some extent, Japanese with left or liberal political leaning) that Japan should compensate Korean individuals who suffered from Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese government has refused to do so, arguing that it settled issues on a government-to-government basis under the 1965 agreement.

However, in January 2005, the South Korean government disclosed 1,200 pages of diplomatic documents that recorded the proceeding of the treaty. The documents, kept secret for 40 years, recorded that the Japanese government actually proposed to the South Korean government to directly compensate individual victims but it was the South Korean government which insisted that it would handle individual compensation to its citizens and then received the whole amount of grants on behalf of the victims.^{[8][9][10]}

The South Korean government demanded a total of 364 million dollars in compensation for the 1.03 million Koreans conscripted into the workforce and the military during the colonial period,^[11] at a rate of 200 dollars per survivor, 1,650 dollars per death and 2,000 dollars per injured person.^[12] South Korea agreed to demand no further compensation, either at the government or individual level, after receiving \$800 million in grants and [soft loans](#) from Japan as compensation for its 1910–45 colonial rule in the treaty.^[10]

However, the South Korean government used most of the grants for economic development,^[13] failing to provide adequate compensation to victims by paying only 300,000 won per death in compensating victims of forced labor between 1975 and 1977.^[12] Instead, the government spent most of the money establishing social infrastructures, founding [POSCO](#), building [Gyeongbu Expressway](#) and the [Soyang Dam](#) with the technology transfer from Japanese companies.^[14] This investment was named [Miracle on the Han River](#) in South Korea.

As the result of this revelation^[according to whom?], there have been growing calls for the South Korean government to compensate the victims. A survey conducted shortly after the disclosure showed that more than 70 percent of South Koreans believe the South Korean government should bear responsibility to pay for those victims. The South Korean government announced that it will establish a team to deal with the appeals for compensation, although "It has been the government's position that compensation for losses during the Japanese occupation has already been settled".^[11]

See also^[edit]

- Asian Women's Fund
- History of Japan–Korea relations
- Japan–Korea disputes

Notes^[edit]

- Jump up**[^] Oda, Shigeru. "The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), pp. 35-56.
- Jump up**[^] Nobel Peace Prize, Eisaku Sato, Nobel laureate lecture, "The Pursuit of Peace and Japan in the Nuclear Age," December 11, 1974.
- Jump up**[^] Hook, p. 492., p. 492, at [Google Books](#)
- Jump up**[^] Hook, Glenn D. (2001). *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security*, p. 491., p. 491, at [Google Books](#)
- Jump up**[^] Ishikida, Miki Y (2005). *Toward Peace: War Responsibility, Postwar Compensation, and Peace Movements and Education in Japan*. iUniverse. p. 21. ISBN 0595350631. Japan provided South Korea with \$300 million in economic aid through products and services and \$200 million in loans with products and services over the next ten years (1965-1975), together with \$300 million in loans for private trust. In exchange, South Korea renounced all rights to request reparation and compensation.
- Jump up**[^] "대일청구권 자금 쓴 기업들, 징용피해 지원은 '나몰라라'" [Companies benefitted by the Japanese loan and grant disregard the victims of conscription]. The Hankyoreh. May 30, 2012.
- Jump up**[^] 청구권자금백서 [Claim fund White Paper]. Economic Planning Board. December 20, 1976.
- Jump up**[^] Documents show Seoul agreed to compensate its citizens over Japan's colonial rule Mainichi January 17, 2005^[dead link]
- Jump up**[^] "Compensation for Colonial Victims Is Not Just a Legal Problem," Chosun Ilbo January 17, 2005
- Jump up**[^] ^a ^b "S.Korea discloses sensitive documents". UPI.com. 17 January 2005.
- Jump up**[^] ^a ^b "Declassified Documents Could Trigger Avalanche of Lawsuits," Chosun Ilbo January 17, 2005
- Jump up**[^] ^a ^b "Seoul Demanded \$364 Million for Japan's Victims Updated," Chosun Ilbo January 17, 2005
- Jump up**[^] "Seoul ready to launch panel on Korean victims of colonial rule," Korea Herald February 11, 2005
- Jump up**[^] Jong sik Kong Korea Was Most Efficient in Utilizing Japanese Reparation, Dong-a Ilbo, JANUARY 19, 2005.

References^[edit]

- [Hook, Glenn D.](#) (2001). *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security*. London: Routledge. [ISBN 9780415240970](#); [ISBN 9780415240987](#); [OCLC 45583501](#)
- [Lundqvist, Stig et al.](#) (1997). *Nobel Lectures, including Presentation Speeches and Laureates' Biographies. 1971-1980*. Singapore: World Scientific. [ISBN 9789810207267](#); [ISBN 978-981-02-0727-4](#); [OCLC 186564406](#)

External links^{[\[edit\]](#)}



Wikisource has
original text related to
this article:

**Treaty on Basic
Relations between
Japan and the Republic
of Korea**

- Wikisource, Treaty text in English; Japanese; Korean
- Wikisource, Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Fisheries
- Wikisource, Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation
- Wikisource, Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Legal Status and Treatment of the People of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan

Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation

*Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation is based on **Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea**, and both were signed on June 22, 1965 at Tokyo simultaneously, and came into effect on December 18, 1965 together, to resolve all problems between Japan and the Republic of Korea.— Excerpted from Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation on Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.*

Japan and the Republic of Korea,

Desiring to settle problems regarding the property of both countries and their peoples and the claims between both countries and between their peoples; and

Desiring to promote economic cooperation between the two countries,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1 Japan shall supply the Republic of Korea with:

(a) Products of Japan and the services of Japanese people, free of charge, the total value of which will be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to three hundred million United States dollars (\$300,000,000), at present computed at one hundred and eight billion yen (¥108,000,000,000), within a period of ten years of the date on which the present Agreement enters into force. The supply of products and services each year shall be limited to so much in yen as shall be equivalent to thirty million United States dollars (\$30,000,000), at present computed at ten billion eight hundred million yen (¥10,800,000,000); when the supply of any one year falls short of this amount, the remainder shall be added to the amount for the next and subsequent years. However, the maximum amount supplied for any one year may be increased by agreement between the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

(b) Long-term and low-interest loans up to so much in yen as shall be equivalent to two hundred million United States dollars (\$200,000,000), at present computed at seventy-two billion yen (¥72,000,000,000), which are requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea and which will be covered by procuring the products of Japan and the services of Japanese people necessary for implementing the enterprises to be decided upon in accordance with arrangements to be concluded

under paragraph 3 within a period of ten years of the date on which the present Agreement enters into force. These loans shall be extended by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, and the Government of Japan shall take the necessary measures to enable the Fund to secure the funds for equal annual loans. The aforesaid supply and loans must serve the economic development of the Republic of Korea.

2 There shall be established a Joint Committee composed of representatives of the two Governments as an organ for consultation between them, with the power to make recommendations on matters concerning the implementation of the present Agreement.

3 The two Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall take measures necessary for the implementation of this Article.

Article II

1 The High Contracting Parties confirm that the problems concerning property, rights, and interests of the two High Contracting Parties and their peoples (including juridical persons) and the claims between the High Contracting Parties and between their peoples, including those stipulated in Article IV(a) of the Peace Treaty with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, have been settled completely and finally.

2 The provisions of this Article shall not affect the following (excluding those which become the objects of special measures taken by either of the High Contracting Parties prior to the date of the signing of the present Agreement):

(a) The property, rights, and interests of the people of either High Contracting Party who have ever resided in the territory of the other High Contracting Party in the period between August 15, 1947, and the date of the signing of the present Agreement; and

(b) The property, rights, and interests of either High Contracting Party and its people which were acquired or brought under the control of the other High Contracting Party in the course of ordinary contacts after August 15, 1945.

3 As a condition to comply with the provisions of paragraph 2 above, no claims shall be made with respect to the measures relating to the property, rights, and interests of either High Contracting Party and its people which were brought under the control of the other High Contracting Party on the date of the signing of the present Agreement, or to all the claims of either High Contracting Party and its people arising from the causes which occurred prior to that date.

Article III

1 Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or the implementation of this Agreement shall be settled primarily through diplomatic channels.

2 Any dispute which cannot be settled under the provision of paragraph 1 above shall be submitted for decision to an arbitral commission of three arbitrators; one to be appointed by the Government of

each High Contracting Party within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt by the Government of either High Contracting Party from that of the other High Contracting Party of a note requesting arbitration of the dispute; and the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen or to be nominated by the Government of a third power as agreed upon by the two arbitrators within a further period of thirty days. However, the third arbitrator must not be a national of either High Contracting Party.

3 If, within the periods respectively referred to, the Government of either High Contracting Party fails to appoint an arbitrator, or the third arbitrator or the third nation is not agreed upon, the arbitral commission shall be composed of one arbitrator to be nominated by the Government of each of two nations respectively chosen by the Government of each High Contracting Party within a period of thirty days, and the third arbitrator to be nominated by the Government of a third power decided upon by agreement between the Governments so chosen.

4 The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall accept decisions rendered by the arbitral commission established in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article IV

The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five in the Japanese and Korean languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR JAPAN FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Etsusaburo Shiina Tong Won Lee

Shinichi Takasugi Dong Jo Kim

<https://studyofenglish.wordpress.com/2007/04/10/ianfu-comfort-woman-sex-slave-yoshida-seiji-japan-korea/>

Study of English

April 10, 2007

Korean news paper denied the YOSHIDA, Seiji's testimony on the comfort women issue.

Filed under: **IANFU 'comfort women', Japan, Korea** — Sei-no-Syounagon @ 11:41 am

Korean news paper denied the YOSHIDA, Seiji's testimony on the comfort women issue.

Mr.YOSHIDA, Seiji's testimony on the 'Comfort women' issue was a lie. The fact was clarified by the investigation of a newspaper of South Korea.

'Jeju newspaper'(Jeju island, Korea) on August 14, 1989 reported concerning the Mr.YOSHIDA, Seiji's testimony as follows. The reporter is Ms. Heo, Yeong-Sun.
(Korean Language→Japanese→Poor English. It is not a strict translation. Please note it.)

The record with "205 women on the Jeju island were requisitioned as comfort women at the Japanese empire age " is published on the 44th anniversary of liberating and a big testimony is given.

However, there is no testimony that proves it, and the doubt has extended.

(Outline of the book written by Mr.YOSHIDA in '83)

The story "15-16 people were compelling requisitioned at the shellfish button factory" and "The comfort women hunting was done in a village here and there" is described in this book. However, There are few people who do the testimony that proves these stories. Natives of the island refuse, and declare the doubt on the credibility of this writing strongly, saying that "It is a lie".

Ms. Chong oc-tane (85-year-old woman) was said, "If as many as 15 people were requisitioned in this village with only 250 houses or more, it is a big incident. However, there was no such fact at that time."

Local historian Mr. Kim Pons-oku is getting indignant.,

"It was turned out that there are parts not true as a result of the pursuit investigation after a Japanese version (YOSHIDA's book) had come out in 1983 for several years.

This book seems the product of frivolous commercial spirit that shows a Japanese corruption.”



In the Far Eastern international, military trial, the “comfort women issue” doesn’t exist at all. It doesn’t exist at all when Japan-Korea Basic Relations Treaty is concluded in year of the ‘65, too.

In ‘77 and ‘83, the two books of Mr.YOSHIDA,Seiji confessed “I compelling took the comfort women” were published. And in ‘91, Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, Japan, Leftist newspaper to cooperate with “People’s Daily” the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China) reported “comfort women issue” based on the Mr.YOSHIDA’s testimony many times without verifying whether the fact. And it became a major issue.

However, already in year of the ‘89, the conclusion concerning the books of Mr.YOSHIDA like the above-mentioned article had been reached. The professor of Nihon University:HATA,Ikuhiko also did the field survey of Jeju island in ‘92, and the same conclusion as the newspaper was put out.

When Prof. HATA met Mr.YOSHIDA and asked it, Mr.YOSHIDA admitted it was a fiction that he had written.

Such a basic fact seems not to be known except Japan.

Many of Koreans do not know this fact, too. People who know this disregard it.

Prof. Hata was asked by the reporter Ms. Heo, Yeong-Sun, "Why did he write such a lie?", and was at a loss because of the answer.

Mr. YOSHIDA runs from the '*Japan Communist Party*' for the Shimonoseki-city municipal election in April, 1947, and defeated by only 129 vote margins. The answer of their doubts is surmisable from this fact.

Study of English

March 22, 2007

Foreign Correspondents Ask about "Comfort Women"

Filed under: [comfort women](#), [Corea](#), [Corea\(Korea\)](#), [IANFU](#) 'comfort women' — Sei-no-

Syounagon @ 12:13 pm

Tags: [comfort woman](#), [comfort women](#), [Corea](#), [ianfu](#), [Japan](#), [Korea](#), [WW2](#)

<http://www.jiyuu-shikan.org/e/comfort.html>

Foreign Correspondents Ask about "Comfort Women"

answered by Fujioka Nobukatsu

Heated Q&A Session follows Professor Fujioka's Talk at the Foreign Correspondents' Club

In the Q & A session, English was used by questioners and Japanese by Professor Fujioka for answers. The questions are unchanged from the original. Certain revisions have been made in the English translated replies for greater clarity.

Question 1 (Gebhard Hielscher, Sudduetsche Zeitung) :

You say there's no evidence of foreign women having been forced into prostitution, and use as a case one particular incident. I have not checked out Mr. Yoshida's village, so if that case is right or wrong, I don't know, but there's plenty of other villages, where it has been established that many women were actually tricked or forced from villages into service for the Japanese, which turned out to be prostitution, which they didn't know when they were taken from their village as young girls, not as prostitutes.

I've talked to several of them myself already many years ago at a seminar in Shizuoka, where some of them were there. There have been later cases. There's no question that many of these cases exist, so I find it strange how you can make a statement, that there's no evidence. There's plenty of evidence. If you don't want to recognize it, that's your problem, not a problem of history.

When you then say the Japanese didn't commit any worse crimes than anybody else, that may be so, but you think that, for instance, if you drive faster than the drive limit

allows, and the police stops you, and you say, well, there were others who also drove faster, that will save you from punishment? That is, what I'm trying to say is you have to handle your own problems, others will have to handle theirs.

For instance, you didn't even mention the statement by the government, Mr. Kono, when he was government spokesman for the Miyazawa government at the end. He made a official statement, the government was in fact through the army involved in prostitution. How can you make such a statement that there's no evidence without even referring to the government acknowledgement of it? I find it very strange, and I find it particularly strange from someone who calls himself an academic.

Answer 1 (Fujioka) :

Thank you for your very straightforward question.

I believe that the questions that you have just posed need to be placed on the table when we talk about "military comfort women".

There were three points in your question.

First of all, you have no objections about what I have just mentioned about the testimony by Mr. Yoshida.

However, I should emphasize that comfort women became a serious issue only after almost ten years after Mr. Yoshida's book got published, in 1983. "Comfort women" were never mentioned before that time.

I mentioned Professor Hata's field trip. I should emphasize that even before his research trip, a Korean reporter studied it on her own initiative and had reached the conclusion that such a thing had not occurred, that Mr. Yoshida's story about the Japanese army kidnapping Korean women and forcing them into prostitution was totally fictitious. This was the conclusion of a Korean reporter, working for a Korean newspaper.

The reason why the reporter started delving into this topic was that she had read the Korean translated version of Yoshida Seiji's book about the forced transport of Korean women, described very vividly. The translation came out in 1989. The reporter is from the area of Chuje island, where the kidnapping supposedly took place. She was

absolutely amazed, and she started asking senior villagers and local historians. The result was they all denied that there had been such acts.

So I would like you to understand that the testimony of Mr. Yoshida was in fact the starting point of this big issue. This is not one of the later "testimonies", but the very decisive "testimony" that was the starting point of the whole issue.

Now please use your common sense. If truly there had been acts of kidnapping Korean women, numbering over 10,000, by the former Japanese army, if these ladies had been truly forced into trucks, and carried away to war zones to work as sex slaves, why didn't the Korean people resist, even though it was war-time?

Believing such a story amounts to insult to the fathers and mothers of Korean young women.

It is possible to argue that during the war, people were not able to protest because Japan controlled Korea. But what about after the war? After the war, Japan was criticized in many ways for various behavior during the war. Some of these criticisms were natural consequences and rightfully made. However, was Japan ever criticized at that time, even once, for forcing women into becoming comfort women? Never.

In 1965, a normalization treaty called Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was concluded, and agreements were made on, for example, giving up Japanese assets in Korea. All kinds of war-related issues were brought up and hard negotiations were made. If there had been acts as inhuman as forcing women into prostitution, Korea would certainly have taken it up. It would necessitate an immediate apology from Japan, and an even greater sum of reparation. During the whole course of bilateral negotiations, this issue was not once taken up.

The "testimonies" you mention have all appeared after the publication of Mr. Yoshida's story, after which the "comfort women" issue began to take shape. What I'm saying is I do not doubt the ladies had worked as prostitutes in war zone, but there is no evidence that they were forced into prostitution by the Japanese army.

Let me answer the second question, on war crimes. I'm in total agreement that one cannot rationalize a speed limit violation just because another guy has also committed a speed limit violation. The important thing is the nature and the degree of war crimes committed by Japan. For these crimes, Japan has already completed ample indemnity and apologies.

Thirdly, I'd like to talk about the statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono, during the Miyazawa administration. It pains me as a Japanese citizen to say this, but I believe that our government often loses its function as a normal, independent, autonomous entity.

Mr.Kono's statement is such an example. If the Japanese government had carried out an extensive study, surely there would have been numerous witnesses to testify about forced transport of women. The government did nothing of the sort. All it did was to go to locations pre-designated by former comfort women, and listen only to their stories. The government did not bother to cross-check their stories.

There is absolutely no public document, or any other evidence, that even hints at the possibility that the military took away Korean women, and forced them into prostitution.

Nevertheless, despite all these facts, Mr. Kono made an announcement, in ambiguous words, which can be interpreted to mean the government acknowledges that the army enforced Korean women into prostitution. This lamentable incident has greatly hurt the honor and dignity of the Japanese people. The Japanese government has bowed to the pressure of the Korean government and other activist groups to issue a statement without verifying the facts. It's a very complex issue and I could talk on and on, but I would like to stop here.

Question 2 (Peter McGill, Asahi Evening News) :

First of all you said Japan has profoundly apologized and paid for its war crimes. That is so, such nonsense, that is almost laughable. If it's true, then there really wouldn't be a problem. We all know it's a major problem around the world. Japan has not profoundly apologized for it, and certainly not paid for it. I mean, I really can't understand how a

professor of any university, let alone Todai, can make such a preposterous statement, as you have today before this gathering.

I have two questions.

First is what you say about national honor. That sort of thing usually goes together with concern about national security. Now, you haven't mentioned national security, but I naturally assume that you believe it should be re-doubled and strengthened and all those kind of things.

What about the alternative proposition that people such as yourself, the so-called revisionists, who say that Japan has nothing to apologize for and really didn't do anything wrong, are in fact enemies of Japan's national security, because they are largely responsible for the ideas they espouse, create such suspicion and distrust of Japan around the world. The major reason why Japan has so few friends anywhere in the world, because people just don't trust a nation that behaves and says things like that. You're actually damaging very profoundly the national security of your country. What do you think about that?

My second question is, I'm sure you don't intend this, but you've become a hero of right-wing thugs of this country, the people who threaten publishers, who have resorted to violence and murder, not just in the 1930's, but in the far more recent past in Japan, and they treat you like an intellectual hero. Of course, they're the enemies of free speech, they're the enemies of democracy.

I mean, they... How can one describe them? I was wondering, how you find that compatible with, you know, being the professor of Japan's leading university, paid for by all of us taxpayers. You know, you're actually a civil servant. Todai is supposed to be, you know, the citadel of freedom and free speech. Yet you're being idolized by people who believe in the opposite, who want to end free speech, who threaten people who don't agree with you.

Answer 2 (Fujioka) :

First of all, there is absolutely no truth to the fact that I am denying all war crimes committed by Japan. What I am saying is that Japan's war crimes have been no worse

than war crimes committed by other countries. Today's topic is about the accusation that the Japanese army took women away and forced them to become prostitutes. This accusation is totally unjustified. The Japanese army never did a thing like that. Why does my denial on this particular point leads you to the conclusion that I am denying all Japanese war crimes? Your question is illogical and misleading.

You also say that such a denial makes the position of Japan a bad one, one without friends.

Actually, the opposite is true. End of last year, President Ziang Zemin of China visited Japan. He demanded written apologies from the Japanese government, which Japan refused. Afterwards, The London Economist commented that the Japanese government did a good thing for the world. Why? Because The London Economist said the boss of a communist party, which has killed tens of millions of its own people, is not qualified to attack something that happened more than 50 years ago. They called it "stomach churning".

It is true that arguments like yours exist, and it is a handy one for attacking Japan. However, the world does not necessarily agree with you. We need to look at things in a balanced way. I believe that time has come to stop endless apologies, but rather distinguish between right and wrong, and deal with issues in a well-balanced manner. I believe that today's world appreciates more a Japanese who can deal with matters rationally and resolutely.

You mention that I am supported by the right wing, who threaten publishers. I have nothing to do with such people. I do not believe in such acts, and when you criticize me in such a way, you should provide evidence. I'm positively against such behavior. For example, there have been acts by right wings, who cut the screen of a film they didn't like. I think this is very foolish behavior, and it has exactly a reverse effect. I believe in freedom, democracy, and protection of free speech, and which are pre- conditions for Japanese society to advance, and that includes history education.

You are calling me the hero of such rightists. Is there any data about this? However I can speculate on the reasons. I think these people are not seriously thinking about historical issues, or they have reverse intentions. In Japan, we have a phrase,

“homegoroshi”, or “praise someone to kill him” It is in fact possible to do this. You praise someone so high, that people will have an opposite reaction to that praise. Politically, it is a very simple method. I hope you honorable reporters will not be fooled by it.

Question 3 (A. Horvat, Tokyo resident) :

In 1989, the well-known British sociologist Ronald Dore gave a talk at this club, and he was also asked at that time about the comfort women controversy. He made the following rather prescient suggestion, and that is that “wouldn’t it be great if the Japanese government would hand over this subject to an impartial body of foreign historians, which might be acceptable to all sides, and to ask them to look into details from an impartial third-party point of view, and come back with a report.

Professor Dore suggested there had been several German companies that had done the same thing, and had opened their files about the abuses which they were accused of doing during World War II.

A number of these companies had accepted the reports, and have abided by them and considered them part of their corporate history. I’m wondering if your group would be interested in having such a body set up, and whether you would be willing to abide by the conclusions of an international group of historians?

Answer 3 (Fujioka) :

Thank you for your very constructive opinion. Your suggest that the Japanese government hand over research to a third foreign party.

The presumption here is that the Japanese government would make efforts to arrive at a conclusion that benefits national interest, as much as possible. However, as Mr. Kono’s statement shows, the reverse is the case. Even today, there is no authoritative body in this country making the effort to pursue the truth. Because of this fact, I believe that, first of all, the Japanese government should terminate Mr. Kono’s unfounded statement, and start research on facts. Nothing will start without such a vital process. Of course, if an international organ or a group of scholars could be set up, with their neutrality and fairness guaranteed, I think that would be wonderful.

However, the way things are now, the Japanese government should utilize all its facilities and ability to carry out an investigation. For example, there are many people in Korea who lived through the same time period as when the supposed kidnapping took place. The government should ask these people what they know. I believe that such an investigation will reveal how fabricated the story is. So far the government has done nothing of the sort.

A governmental investigation should precede others, and when arguments from both sides are on the table, if international scholars investigate the matter further, from such a foundation, I think it could be a very fair process, to solve the matter conclusively.

Question 4 (Kang, Life and Dream Publishing Company, South Korea) :

My English is maybe not good enough, but I'll try to speak in English. We have basic difference, between you and me, between us, because you think there was no military comfort women, especially compulsory military comfort women. I and we think there are. I've so many things I can argue with you, but I'm afraid we have not enough time today. For instance, let me say a couple of things.

You say why Korean government did not act aggressively, I noticed. Why Korean peoples did not protest , when their daughter was dragged, I know the answer. If you like to know the reason for all of these, I'm willing to supply you the reason. I'm a free man. Maybe it will help you to your study. But today, I'd like to ask you, you are strongly working to delete this military comfort women clause in history book. Maybe you are ? in Japan. But how about have you ever thought of it globally, or of the same issues in other countries ? I'm saying students, when Japanese students, I should say your purification movement, they may think eventually there was no military comfort women, but the other countries, they will have more and more, this movement, will be progressed. Don't you think there is this big gap between the young people of Japan and other countries will make a serious problem?

Second question. Well, you can answer or not, you are free. More than one million Japanese young and strong soldiers went out to the front line. How do you think they solved their sexual appetite or sexual problem? You mentioned that mostly there were

prostitutes. You think Japan had enough prostitutes to meet the demand of more than one million strong and young soldiers? Thank you.

Answer 4 (Fujioka) :

I'm not sure whether you are stating an opinion, or a question.

You say you have answers about why the Koreans did not oppose or criticize the Japanese. I can guess at your answers that you wish to give me, but since you are not making a public comment about it, I will not comment on it here.

You ask me whether I am considering this issue from a global viewpoint, and my answer is that of course I am considering it from a global, international viewpoint.

Judging the matter against international standards, I believe that the Japanese army did not take away unwilling women to force them into prostitution. However, I do imagine that during the war, there were war crimes committed by Japan. However, such war crimes, if they occurred, should be treated under the same standards as war crimes committed by other countries.

However, at the moment, Japan is being singled out for this issue. False information is being disseminated throughout the world under particular political intentions. I would like to remind you that the information is based on a false testimony, and an apology of the Japanese government, made without proper investigation. I intend to continue with my effort to erase the bad image that has been propagated throughout the world.

As for answering the sexual needs of one million soldiers, this kind of problem has existed for all armies of all countries. When Korea fought in the Vietnam War, the same problem surfaced. So my point is that surely the same international standard should be applied to discuss this issue.

<https://studyofenglish.wordpress.com/2007/04/01/ianfu-comfort-woman-sex-slave-korea-korean-japan-5/>

Study of English

April 1, 2007

BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE. The Yomiuri News paper, Japan

Filed under: IANFU 'comfort women', Japan, Korea, U.S.A. — Sei-no-Syounagon @ 3:28 am

BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE / Comfort station originated in govt-regulated 'civilian prostitution'

The Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri news paper, Tokyo, Japan)

[background-of-comfort-women-issue-_1-3.pdf](#)

<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20070331dy01.htm>

Controversy over the so-called comfort women has been inflamed again. The U.S. House of Representatives has been deliberating a draft resolution calling for the Japanese government to apologize over the matter by spurning the practice as slavery and human trafficking. Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed? The Yomiuri Shimbun carried in-depth reports on the issue Tuesday. The writers are Masanobu Takagi, Hiroaki Matsunaga and Emi Yamada of the political news department. Starting today, The Daily Yomiuri will carry the stories in three installments.

To discuss the comfort women issue, it is indispensable to understand the social background of the time when prostitution was authorized and regulated by the government in Japan. Prostitution was tacitly permitted in limited areas up until 1957, when the law to prevent prostitution was enforced.

Comfort women received remuneration in return for sexual services at so-called comfort stations for military officers and soldiers. According to an investigation report publicized by the government on Aug. 4, 1993, on the issue of comfort women recruited into

sexual service for the Japanese military, there is a record mentioning the establishment of such a brothel in Shanghai around 1932, and additional similar facilities were established in other parts of China occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army.

Some of them were under the direct supervision of the military authorities, but many of the brothels catering to soldiers were privately operated.

Modern historian Ikuhiko Hata, a former professor at Nihon University, says the comfort women system should be defined as the "battleground version of civilian prostitution."

Comfort women were not treated as "paramilitary personnel," unlike jugun kangofu (military nurses) and jugun kisha (military correspondents). During the war, comfort women were not called "jugun ianfu" (prostitutes for troops). Use of such generic terminology spread after the war. The latter description is said to have been used by writer Kako Senda (1924-2000) in his book titled "Jugun Ianfu" published in 1973. Thereafter, the usage of jugun ianfu prevailed.

In addition to Japanese women, women from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, both then under Japanese colonial rule, and China, the Philippines, Indonesia and other countries invaded by the Imperial Japanese Army were recruited as comfort women.

Hata estimates that 40 percent of the wartime comfort women were Japanese, 30 percent Chinese and other nationalities and 20 percent Korean.

The total number of comfort women has yet to be determined exactly.

According to a report compiled by Radhika Coomaraswamy of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1996, there were 200,000 comfort women from the Korean Peninsula alone. The figure in the report was based on information Coomaraswamy had obtained in North Korea. But this report contained many factual errors, and its quoted sources lacked impartiality. Foreign Minister Taro Aso rejected the figure of 200,000 as "lacking objective evidence."

The reasons cited for the need for comfort women and wartime brothels are as follows:

- To prevent military officers and soldiers from raping women and committing other sex crimes in occupied areas.
- To prevent venereal disease from spreading through troops who would otherwise contact local prostitutes who did not receive periodic medical checks.
- To prevent military secrets from being leaked by limiting the women who provided sexual services to officers and soldiers to recruited comfort women.

Such a system and the use of wartime brothels generally are not limited only to the Imperial Japanese military.

The U.S. troops that occupied Japan after the war used brothels provided by the Japanese side. There was a case in which U.S. military officials asked the Japanese authorities to provide women for sexual services. During the Vietnam War, brothels similar to those established for the former Japanese military were available to U.S. troops, a U.S. woman journalist has pointed out.

Hata said: "There were wartime brothels also for the German troops during World War II. Some women were forced into sexual slavery. South Korean troops had brothels during the Korean War, according to a finding by a South Korean researcher."

(Mar. 31, 2007)

BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE / No hard evidence of coercion in recruitment of comfort women

The Yomiuri Shimbun

<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20070331dy02.htm>

This is the second installment on the so-called "comfort women" controversy. The U.S. House of Representatives has been deliberating a draft resolution calling for the Japanese government to apologize over the matter by spurning the practice as slavery and human trafficking. Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed?

The issue of the so-called comfort women has been brought up repeatedly because misunderstandings that the Japanese government and the Imperial Japanese Army forced women into sexual servitude have not been completely dispelled.

The government has admitted the Imperial Japanese Army's involvement in brothels, saying that "the then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women." The "involvement" refers to giving the green light to opening a brothel, building facilities, setting regulations regarding brothels, such as fees and opening hours, and conducting inspections by army doctors.

However, the government has denied that the Japanese military forcibly recruited women. On March 18, 1997, a Cabinet Secretariat official said in the Diet, "There is no evidence in public documents that clearly shows there were any forcible actions [in recruiting comfort women]." No further evidence that could disprove this statement has been found.

The belief that comfort women were forcibly recruited started to spread when Seiji Yoshida, who claimed to be a former head of the mobilization department of the Shimonoseki branch of an organization in charge of recruiting laborers, published a book titled "Watashi no Senso Hanzai" (My War Crime) in 1983. Yoshida said in the book that he had been involved in looking for suitable women to force them into sexual slavery in Jeju, South Korea. "We surrounded wailing women, took them by the arms and dragged them out into the street one by one," he said in the book.

But researchers concluded in the mid-1990s that the stories in the book are not authentic. On March 5 this year, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said at the House of Councillors Budget Committee that Yoshida's story does not prove that women were forcibly recruited. He said: "I think it was The Asahi Shimbun [that reported the story] that a man named Seiji Yoshida testified about his having searched for comfort women. But later [Yoshida's testimony] was found to have been made up."

As the comfort women issue started to take on political and diplomatic dimensions, some people in South Korea and also in Japan confused comfort women with female volunteer corps, strengthening the misbelief that there was coercion.

Female volunteer corps were, according to a historian Ikuhiko Hata's book "Ianfu to Senjo no Sei" (Comfort Women and Sex in the Battlefield), single women aged between 12 and 40 who were mobilized to work in factories, starting in August 1944, primarily to secure necessary labor.

There were cases in which malicious brokers sweet-talked women with promises of easy money or intentionally concealed from them what life was going to be like in brothels.

The War Ministry wrote a letter, dated March 4, 1938, to the troops dispatched to China. The letter, titled "Regarding the recruiting of women at the army's comfort stations," said there were malicious brokers who were recruiting women in a way "similar to kidnapping."

It said, "Nothing should be overlooked so that the military's prestige and social orders are maintained." The letter indicates how the Imperial Japanese Army tried to make sure that women were not forcibly recruited.

However, in the confusion of war, elite Imperial Japanese Army soldiers who were on the fast track for officer status sent detained Dutch women to a brothel in Indonesia. The incident came to be known as the Semarang incident.

The Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters closed down the brothel immediately after learning of the incident, and soldiers involved received severe punishment—some were sentenced to death—at a war crimes court convened by the Dutch Army after the war.

(Mar. 31, 2007)

BACKGROUND OF 'COMFORT WOMEN' ISSUE / Kono's statement on 'comfort women' created misunderstanding
The Yomiuri Shimbun

<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20070402dy01.htm>

This is the third and last installment on the so-called “comfort women” controversy. The U.S. House of Representatives has been deliberating a draft resolution calling for the Japanese government to apologize over the matter by spurning the practice as slavery and human trafficking. Why has such a biased view of the issue prevailed?

What made the issue of “comfort women” a political and diplomatic one was an article in the Jan. 11, 1992, morning edition of The Asahi Shimbun. The newspaper reported that official documents and soldiers’ diaries that proved the wartime Japanese military’s involvement in the management of brothels and the recruitment of comfort women had been found at the library of the Defense Ministry’s National Institute for Defense Studies.

The article said Koreans accounted for about 80 percent of comfort women from the time that brothels were established and that the women, said to have totaled 80,000 to 200,000, were forcibly recruited under the name of volunteer corps after the Pacific War broke out.

As the newspaper’s report came out immediately before then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa’s visit to South Korea, it triggered anger among the South Korean public. During his visit to the nation, Miyazawa met with then South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and was quoted as telling him, “It can’t be denied that the Japanese military—in some way—was involved in the recruitment of comfort women and the management of comfort stations.”

On July 6, 1992, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato released the results of a study showing that the wartime military was directly involved in such things as the operation of “comfort stations,” but documents to prove that forcible recruitment actually took place were not found.

But as South Korea’s criticism over Japan’s actions continued, the government issued an official statement on the issue on Aug. 4, 1993, which became known as the Kono statement, after the government official who delivered it, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono.

But Kono's statement included ambiguous expressions and gave the impression that the government had acknowledged forcible recruitment by wartime Japanese authorities.

Regarding the recruitment of comfort women, the statement said: "The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, and so on, and that, at times, administrative and military personnel directly took part in the recruitment."

The statement also said the recruitment, transfer and control of comfort women on the Korean Peninsula was "conducted generally against their will." This expression became a strong indication that women, in most cases, were taken in a forcible manner.

By issuing the statement, the government aimed to seek a political settlement over the issue, as South Korea pressed the Japanese government hard to recognize that forcible recruitment actually took place. Then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara, who was involved in compiling the statement, said, "As there were no documents to prove forcible recruitment, it was concluded, out of comprehensively made judgments based on testimonies of [former] comfort women, that [recruitment] was forceful."

Kono's statement did not resolve the issue. Instead, it spread misunderstanding both inside and outside the nation on the "forcible recruitment" by government authorities.

A U.N. Human Rights Commission report, compiled by Radhika Coomaraswamy, referred to comfort women as sex slaves, and called on the Japanese government to compensate these women and to punish those responsible. The report reached these conclusions partly on the grounds of Kono's statement.

Mike Honda, a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives who led lawmakers in submitting a draft resolution denouncing Japan over the comfort women issue, also referred to Kono's statement as a basis for the draft resolution.

However, observers have pointed out, and The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on the morning edition of March 16, that there are certain factors regarding Honda's electoral

district—such an increase in the number of residents of Chinese or South Korean origins, while the number of Japanese-origin residents has decreased—that may be behind why the Japanese-American lawmaker of California is leading such an initiative.

Given the Kono statement, the government in July 1995 established an incorporated foundation called the Asian Women's Fund. It has provided a total of about 1.3 billion yen in compensation for 364 former comfort women. Letters of apology from successive prime ministers—Ryutaro Hashimoto, Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and Junichiro Koizumi—also were sent to those women.

On Oct. 5 at the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe indicated a stance to “inherit” Kono's statement in principle, while denying forcible recruitment by government authorities.

(Apr. 1, 2007)

Japan asks for revision of 1996 U.N. report on ‘comfort women’

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

The Japanese government asked for a partial revision of a 1996 report on wartime “comfort women” by a United Nations special rapporteur, but the request was immediately rejected.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told an Oct. 16 news conference that the revision request was made to Radhika Coomaraswamy, who compiled the report for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

According to Foreign Ministry officials, Kuni Sato, the Foreign Ministry ambassador in charge of human rights and humanitarian issues, met with Coomaraswamy in New York on Oct. 14 and asked her to revise references to a book written by Seiji Yoshida on how he forcibly took away comfort women from South Korea.

Coomaraswamy, a legal expert from Sri Lanka, refused to change the report, saying the Yoshida reference was only one part of the evidence, according to Suga and Foreign Ministry officials.

In early August, The Asahi Shimbun compiled [a special coverage package](#) of its past reporting on the comfort women issue and concluded that Yoshida’s testimony was a fabrication. Asahi retracted its articles related to testimony by Yoshida.

At his news conference, Suga cited the Asahi’s retraction of the articles as a reason for making the revision request.

“We will persistently explain to the international community, beginning with the United Nations, in order to obtain their understanding,” Suga said at his news conference.

The 1996 U.N. report does not quote from any Asahi article, including those related to Yoshida.

About 300 words in the report are devoted to Yoshida. Clearly stating that the information was taken from Yoshida's book, the report states that “he confesses to having been part of slave raids in which, among other Koreans, as many as 1,000 women were obtained for ‘comfort women’ duties under the National Labor Service Association as part of the National General Mobilization Law.”

The report also states that historian Ikuhiko Hata refuted what was described in Yoshida’s book.

The 1996 report referred to comfort women as “military sex slaves” and included six recommendations for the Japanese government, such as acknowledging legal responsibility and paying compensation to the victims.

The report was compiled after visits to Japan and South Korea in which former comfort women and researchers were interviewed.

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On October 16, 2013 Sankei Shimbun reported that the Japanese government conducted research to interview 16 would-be former comfort women in South Korea before the Kono Speech was delivered. What were revealed in the article were that interviewees' answers were ambiguous having discrepancies compared with their answers on other occasions, in addition that many of their names, birth dates and addresses were incorrect, consequently proving that the interviews conducted by the Japanese government were not worth becoming historical evidence. Therefore, the authenticity of the Kono Speech is doubtful now.

On August 5, 2014, Asahi Shimbun published an article officially admitting that the articles on the comfort women were published based on the two story books written by YOSHIDA Seiji without checking the authenticity of the books.

Soon afterwards, SUGIURA Nobuyuki, Chief Editor of Asahi Shimbun, said as follows.

"When the comfort women issue was slowly be known in Japan in early 1990's, there wasn't much research on it. We kept writing related articles based on interviewed reports of former comfort women and a limited amount of documents. We came to know that parts of the reports were with incorrect statements. These erroneous write-ups occurred because we didn't grasp the whole picture of this issue. I know that we didn't verify our reports much. "

Yokoi: First of all, in my opinion, the verification of the Kono Statement proved that the statement had many doubts. So, the ground of the argument on the comfort women issue collapsed. Secondly, media like Sankei Shimbun, weekly magazines , monthly magazines criticized Asahi Shimbun loudly and openly. In addition, the criticizing voices of ordinary Japanese people have grown so large on the Internet. Asahi was particularly fearful of the strong influence of the Internet.

Fujiwara: I agree with you. The power of the Internet is quite strong. Ordinary Japanese people who are not famous at all challenged such a huge media company, Asahi, which was not able to smash them.

Yokoi: According to mass media people, the Internet activities frightened Asahi Shimbun so much. On the Internet, information is spread instantly. On the other hand, the newspapers release articles in the morning papers or evening papers each day. Even digital news publishing can't catch up with the speed of the Internet, where so many unspecified ordinary people transmit and exchange information quickly around the clock. Asahi succumbed to the citizen power after all.

Fujiwara: I hear that former reporter Uemura has been cornered on the Internet.

Akamine: I called Hokusei Gakuen University to get information on the position of Mr. Uemura the other day. I received a very delicate response from the school. I expected a reply that he was a part-time lecturer, but what I heard was that in the first half semester he was a part-time lecturer but his position in the last half semester was uncertain. It seems that the university became very cautious about Mr. Uemura. I came across two articles on August 14th and 21st of Shukan Bunshu (Weekly Bunshu) which said, "the former Asahi Shimbun reporter who added fuel to the comfort women issue was fired by a women's college, and now he fled to the north. Reading such articles, perhaps the university became cautious.

Fujiwara: Former reporter Uemura may be very nervous now. He avoided an interview requested by Shukan Bunshu in the Spring this year. Newspaper companies and their

reporters are good at accusing people based on justice, but when they are accused, they run away quickly.

Yokoi: As already mentioned, the conflict between the management and the editors of Asahi may be intensifying. Mr. Akamine presented "the summon request to the Diet". Asahi Shimbun has to be summoned to the Diet because Asahi has committed crimes to insult and slander Japan and Japanese people with lies. The president of Asahi may not like to be summoned, but he will have to be prepared for it.

Akamine: According to the Asahi's internal turmoil, many employees of Asahi started to argue that the president will have to resign to put an end to this trouble or that the resignation of the president won't be sufficient, etc. Inside Asahi Shimbun, former reporters and responsible editors are required to come to the headquarters office to discuss what to do from now on. Former reporter Uemura is anxious about his position very much, and under the circumstances where any excuse is allowed, he is now thinking to apologize in public.

Yokoi: I also agree that the resignation of the president will not be sufficient. As you remember, the president of Mainichi Shimbun resigned owing to the Nishiyama Incident (Reporter Nishiyama obtained a national secret from an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through coaxing the official away by establishing sexual relations with her), and leaked it to a congress member of the Socialist Party of Japan). Since its trouble, the number of Mainichi Shimbun newspaper subscribers had dropped significantly, and six years later, Mainichi Shimbun went bankrupt. I am sure that Asahi has been taking this matter quite seriously.

Fujiwara: According to the information source, a blog article titled "Crisis of Asahi Shimbun and Anguish" says the business of Asahi Shimbun is in a slump.

Akamine: I know that. Asahi Shimbun has an incurred loss of 97 billion yen (9 billion yen per year), which is 25 million yen per day. Asahi has been spreading lies and fabricated stories in addition to hiding its dark part.

Fujiwara: Moreover this blog repeatedly divulging the numbers of newspapers actually sold.

Akamine: The actual number of newspaper sales is 280 million copies against the officially reported number of 7.6 million copies. On the other hand, the actual number of newspaper sales of Yomiuri Shimbun is 6 millions against its official number of 10 millions.

Yokoi: Owing to this trouble, more and more readers of Asahi will give up on Asahi Shimbun. The moment when Asahi's crimes are argued in the Diet, more people will stop reading Asahi Shimbun. Japanese never like injustice. If crimes committed by Asahi

come out one after another in the Diet, Asahi will be coerced to apologize. From now on Asahi's newspapers will have to keep writing words of apology and corrected articles.

Yokoi: What will happen afterwards will be that many people who liked Asahi Shimbun may start to call Asahi as a traitor company. They are anti-Japan people, who will start to criticize Asahi for having deceived them with fabricated articles written by Asahi reporters. At present, South Korea hasn't realized the underlying message in This Article yet because the article concluded with the words, "Let's look straight at the intrinsic nature of the comfort women issue which damaged the dignity of comfort women". However, pretty soon many Koreans will start to accuse Asahi Shimbun as the traitor newspaper company because they will know, sooner or later, that Asahi kept lying with their fabricated articles.

Akamine: What will you think happen to those progressive intelligent people a.k.a. anti-Japan people who made use of the articles written by Asahi Shimbun?

Yokoi: They would say, "We trusted Asahi Shimbun. We are the victims who were cheated by Asahi". I am sure they will never take any responsibility for what they did.

Fujiwara: I think they are quite dirty. Thanks to Asahi, they were able to enjoy good lives by earning a lot of money. They should not be onlookers when Asahi is about to sink.

Yokoi: All of them will run away from this trouble. If they are true leftists, they will have to protect Asahi and sink together with them.

Akamine: Then, Fukushima Izuho, Sengoku Yoshito, or lawyer Takagi Kenich, and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations may also pretend to be victims of Asahi. In particular the so-called human right advocates who accused Japan for the comfort women issue will disappear as fast as possible. Lawyers of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations kept instigating the Human Right Committee of the United Nations with false information on the comfort women issue will stay away from the committee without apologizing to the supporting members of the committee. How shameful they are!

Yokoi: On the other hand, Murayama Tomiichi, who is not much bright to understand what's been going on may become simply angry.

Fujiwara: Anyway, we will pay attention to what will happen from now on.

Akamine: The information source gave me comments as follows.

"Sugiura Nobuyuki of Asahi in charge of editing has been cornered and keeps saying many excuses.

This published Article was based on the decision made by the editors, and Asahi Shimbun people are so much bewildered.

However, they are not much educated people who dislike to research with their efforts to find true information, their excuses are very childish, thus not being persuasive at all.

They are now trying to protect themselves without caring the company which has hired them.

Some management executives are ranting and raving. So internally in the company there is a very gloomy and unhealthy atmosphere.

All sections in the company are talking about the fabricated comfort women articles.

All employees are concerned about their positions very much.

On the other hand, Korean media shows a preferable attitude to Asahi Shimbun, because they have completely misinterpreted This Article.

They responded only to the expression of "Let's look straight at the intrinsic nature of the comfort women issue which damaged the dignity of comfort women" and they are not aware of the reality that this entire article has overturned the table of the comfort women issue.

Korean media people's intelligence is not sophisticated enough to comprehend the entire article. They think that Asahi's childish excuse will be accepted.

Koreans seem to trust that Asahi Shimbun is authoritative more than Japanese.

If they start to recognize the reality, the situation may change drastically and significantly."

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201410160051

Japan asks for revision of 1996 U.N. report on ‘comfort women’

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According to Foreign Ministry officials, Kuni Sato, the Foreign Ministry ambassador in charge of human rights and humanitarian issues, met with Coomaraswamy in New York on Oct. 14 and asked her to revise references to a book written by Seiji Yoshida on how he forcibly took away comfort women from South Korea.

Coomaraswamy, a legal expert from Sri Lanka, refused to change the report, saying the Yoshida reference was only one part of the evidence, according to Suga and Foreign Ministry officials.

In early August, The Asahi Shimbun compiled [a special coverage package](#) of its past reporting on the comfort women issue and concluded that Yoshida’s testimony was a fabrication. Asahi retracted its articles related to testimony by Yoshida.

At his news conference, Suga cited the Asahi’s retraction of the articles as a reason for making the revision request.

“We will persistently explain to the international community, beginning with the United Nations, in order to obtain their understanding,” Suga said at his news conference.

The 1996 U.N. report does not quote from any Asahi article, including those related to Yoshida.

About 300 words in the report are devoted to Yoshida. Clearly stating that the information was taken from Yoshida's book, the report states that “he confesses to having been part of slave raids in which, among other Koreans, as many as 1,000 women were obtained for ‘comfort women’ duties under the National Labor Service Association as part of the National General Mobilization Law.”

The report also states that historian Ikuhiko Hata refuted what was described in Yoshida’s book.

The 1996 report referred to comfort women as “military sex slaves” and included six recommendations for the Japanese government, such as acknowledging legal responsibility and paying compensation to the victims.

The report was compiled after visits to Japan and South Korea in which former comfort women and researchers were interviewed.

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A Just Peace? The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective

by John Price

On September 4, 1951, delegates from over fifty countries gathered at the San Francisco Opera House to discuss the making of a peace treaty with Japan. Signed by forty-eight countries four days later, on September 8, the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT), as it is better known, contained seven chapters and a preamble. It marked the end of hostilities between the signatories, provided for the termination of the occupation, and specified the details of the settlement of war-related issues.

Chapter I formally ended the state of war and recognized Japan's sovereignty. Japan relinquished control of or claim to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the islands it held in the Pacific, Antarctica, and the Spratly and Paracel islands and, furthermore, gave the U.S. control of the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and other territories (Chapter II). Under Chapter III, the security clause, Japan recognized the U.N. Charter but specified that Japan might enter into "collective security arrangements." Chapter IV, on political and economic issues, specified that Japan would relinquish all special rights and privileges in China, accept the decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE); it also provided for the revival of commercial treaties, including granting the Allied powers MFN (most-favored-nation) status. Chapter V regulated property claims, including reparations and compensation, while Chapter VI referred unresolved disputes to the International Court of Justice. The final articles, Chapter VII, defined the ratification process and included an article (26) that gave any of the signatories most-favored-nation status if Japan were to negotiate a settlement with any other country that provided benefits not in the SFPT. On April 28, 1952, a little over seven months after the signing of the treaty, Japan formally regained its sovereignty.

Most historians today would not contest then prime minister Shigeru Yoshida's conclusion that the peace treaty was fair and generous to Japan. It did not exact heavy reparations nor did it impose any post-treaty supervision over Japan. Indeed, half a century later, the U.S. And Japanese governments continue aggressively to defend the treaty. Its supporters, including the U.S. and Japanese governments, plan a major commemoration in San Francisco on the fiftieth anniversary of the signing.

However, a balanced examination of the treaty process and outcomes reveals the more challenging fact that there was at the time, and continues to be today intense resistance to the SFPT. These dynamics, including the influence of the treaty fifty years after it was signed and the dilemmas associated with its history, are neatly encapsulated in a recent decision of the U.S. judiciary. In 1999, using a section of California state law that extends the statute of limitations for claims against the Nazis and their allies, a group of prisoners of war and forced laborers from World War II in Asia charged that Japanese corporations with subsidiaries in the United States were the legal successors of corporations that had used forced labor during the war and that they were thus liable for redress of the injustices. However, on September 21, 2000, United States District Judge Vaughn R. Walker dismissed the claims of these former U.S. prisoners of war, arguing that the SFPT barred claims such as those asserted by the plaintiffs. The decision states that the SFPT "exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiff's hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the debt" (United States District Court, Northern District of California, Case No. MDL 1347, "World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation," p. 17).

The judge's conclusions were based not only on a strictly legal interpretation of the SFPT, but also

on a judicial review of select historical materials associated with the crafting of the treaty, as well as on submissions by the Department of State which, as *amicus curiae* in the case, argued on the side of the Japanese corporations that the SFPT permanently barred claims against them. After sifting through the historical evidence, Judge Vaughn fortified his ruling with a number of points. During the occupation of Japan, "It soon became clear that Japan's financial condition would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased." Thus, the judge noted, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, argued that full reparations would harm Japan's economy and create a breeding ground for communism. The judge also cited the State Department's *amicus curiae* brief, which held that "the Treaty of Peace with Japan has, over the past five decades, served to sustain U.S. security interests in Asia and to support peace and stability in the region." Since at least ten million people have died in wars in Asia in the past fifty years, including at least 55,000 Americans, the judicial/governmental proposition that Asia has been an oasis of peace and stability since the signing of the SFPT can only be ranked as one of the more abysmal moments of denial.

Upon learning of the verdict, a spokesman for Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the judge's decision, stating that both Japan and the U.S. shared the view that all claims regarding the war were settled by the treaty. The Japanese government reaffirmed its support for the SFPT, which, it stated, was the basis for development of Japan-U.S. relations, calling it "the most important bilateral relationship in the world." The judicial decision, reflecting the positions of the U.S. and Japanese governments, underscores how institutions can generate historical amnesia, in this case by arguing that Japan was unable to support substantial reparations for economic reasons and that other goals had to be sacrificed in the name of fighting communism.

Many historians, on both sides of the Pacific, have provided a more balanced and critical assessment. For the most part there is agreement that the treaty was relatively generous to Japan, but most accounts also accept that much more was involved than just the peace treaty. Writing a quarter century ago, Harvard professor Akira Iriye summarized the nature of the treaty and labeled it the "San Francisco System," which included "The rearmament of Japan, continued presence of American forces in Japan, their military alliance, and the retention by the United States of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands. In return the United States would remove all restrictions on Japan's economic affairs, and renounce the right to demand reparations and war indemnities. Here was a program for turning Japan from a conquered and occupied country to a military ally, frankly aimed at responding to the rising power of the Soviet Union and China in the Asia-Pacific region" (*The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction* [Prentice-Hall, 1974], p. 182). Twenty-three years later, the diplomatic historian Michael Schaller echoed Iriye. "As its defenders later admitted, the peace treaty served as a sweetener for the less equitable security treaty. The security treaty, in turn, screened criticism of the still more controversial administrative agreement that Yoshida [prime minister at the time] planned to ratify by executive agreement" (*Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* [Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 41).

The SFPT was not only a peace treaty; it established an important bilateral military relationship between Japan and the U.S. Furthermore, as part of the peace treaty process, the U.S. coerced Japan into signing a bilateral treaty with Taiwan in 1952, effectively cutting off Japan from continental China. Moreover, at the same time the U.S. "reached defense pacts with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. These agreements (supplemented by the SEATO treaty and pacts with Taiwan and Korea) formed the core of the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region for a quarter century" (Schaller, p. 40). In the process of negotiating the peace treaty and the SFPT itself, the U.S. established the military and economic basis for its Asian empire.

Discussions regarding a peace treaty with Japan began as early as 1946. Just as the U.S. government began to consider the possible terms of a treaty, so too did Japanese policymakers. However, U.S. officials quickly rejected the results of these deliberations as the winds of containment gathered

force in 1947-48. U.S. analysts such as George Kennan articulated the necessity of containing the Soviet Union and communism. Resuscitating Germany and Japan as the workshops of their respective regions was the initial thrust of U.S. containment policy, but the U.S. military and other conservative forces quickly transformed the theory of economic containment into a strategic military policy that became increasingly attractive to the Truman administration, particularly after 1949, when the Communist Party in China seized power and the Soviet Union successfully tested its own nuclear weapons. Attempts to restart negotiations for a peace treaty stalled in 1949 as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense department demanded continued unconditional access to bases in Japan, a right that might be compromised in treaty discussions.

The Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950, created new dynamics as the State Department aligned itself with Defense in the quest for maximum access and flexibility for military operations from Japan. Truman appointed John Foster Dulles, a Republican with the bipartisan connections necessary for domestic acceptance of a treaty, to negotiate one. Dulles visited Japan four times, traveled to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and also visited London and France in his quest for an acceptable treaty. By August 1951, he had come to an agreement with Britain on a jointly proposed treaty, and the U.S., as the host country, issued invitations to over fifty countries to convene in San Francisco to "conclude" the treaty. As the conference approached, however, Asian resistance to the treaty began to make itself felt.

China and the SFPT

On August 16, 1951, the People's Republic of China (PRC) published a statement by Zhou Enlai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding the proposed treaty and conference. The treaty, he stated, violated the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreements, the Potsdam Declaration and Agreement, and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy of the Far Eastern Commission. According to Zhou, "The United Nations Declaration provides that no separate Peace should be made. The Potsdam Agreement states that the 'preparatory work of the Peace Settlements' should be undertaken by those States which were signatories to the terms of surrender imposed upon the Enemy State concerned" (*Documents on New Zealand External Relations* [DNZER], Vol. III, 1985, p. 1092). The PRC, he said, supported the Soviet proposal that all states that participated with their armed forces against Japan should prepare the treaty. Instead, the U.S. had monopolized the task and was now proposing to exclude China when in "the war of resisting and defeating Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, after a bitter struggle of the longest duration, sustained the heaviest losses and made the greatest contribution" (DNZER, p. 1095).

On the specifics of the proposed treaty, the PRC (1) took particular exception to the clause on reparations for Allied property because it rendered Japan liable for damages only after December 7, 1941, ignoring that China was at war with Japan much earlier; (2) refuted the territorial clauses that gave the U.S. control over Pacific islands and neglected to assign sovereignty for Taiwan and the Pescadores as well as the Kuriles to China and the Soviet Union respectively; (3) underscored the absence of safeguards to limit Japan's armed forces, to prevent the resurgence of militaristic organizations, and to ensure democratic rights; and (4) rejected U.S. predominance over Japan's economy and the exclusion of normal trade relations with the PRC. China, Zhou declared, reserved its right to demand reparations from Japan and would refuse to recognize the treaty.

Three specific points of Zhou's critique deserve close scrutiny. Did the SFPT violate World War II agreements? Did the U.S. monopolize and effectively abuse the treaty process? And did the SFPT not assign sovereignty over Taiwan and other territories? Regarding the SFPT's relationship to World War II agreements, there is substantial evidence to support the PRC claim that the treaty violated them. For example, the Allied Declaration signed in Washington on January 1, 1942, was quite clear: "Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies." The United States, the Soviet Union and

China, although then ruled by the Guomindang (the Nationalist Party that later went into exile on Taiwan), signed this declaration and, furthermore, the United States continued to use the Allied Declaration as its own rationale for inviting, or not, specific countries to the peace conference. The U.S. exclusion of China clearly violated not only the spirit but also the letter of that agreement. There is also further evidence that the U.S. and Britain considered the World War II treaties no longer valid. Regarding the Potsdam agreement, as early as September 1949, Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Minister Bevin had agreed that "for practical purposes the Potsdam provisions were no longer valid having outlived their usefulness, and that a peace settlement should be concluded at the earliest possible date" (DNZER, p. 291). The U.S. and Britain thus turned their backs on these agreements without consulting the other parties, giving substance to the PRC claim that the SFPT violated World War II agreements.

As to whether the U.S. monopolized and abused the treaty preparations the evidence is also unequivocal. Most historical accounts point to Soviet objections to a 1947 U.S. proposal to initiate peace treaty negotiations within the eleven-member Far Eastern Commission established to supervise the U.S. occupation of Japan as the major stumbling block to an early peace. This account, however, can be misleading, as any review of the materials will show. The Soviets objected to the U.S. proposal that the treaty be drawn up by FEC members with a two-thirds majority necessary to resolve disputes. The Soviet counter-proposal was that the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) should handle the treaty. The United States recognized that "the CFM was constituted on a basis which would have permitted its use for the preparation of a Treaty of Peace with Japan, provided the members of the Council subsequently agreed," but the U.S. did not and instead counter-proposed that the FEC was the most appropriate body (DNZER, p. 206).

On November 17, 1947, the Chinese government (still the Guomindang) endorsed the U.S. proposal that a special session of the FEC be convened on a date to be decided by the four Big Powers, but it also suggested that those same powers be accorded a veto in the deliberations. In other words, the Chinese government had come partway in meeting the concerns of the Soviet Union that it retain a veto and that the Big Powers retain some role in the process (DNZER, p. 219). This attempt at compromise reflected the fact that China had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union (the Sino-Soviet Agreement of August 14, 1945) that expressly prohibited the signing of a peace treaty with Japan that excluded either of the signatories. The Soviet Union, unwisely as it turns out, rejected this proposal but so too did the U.S. and, more particularly, the Commonwealth countries (New Zealand, Australia, Canada), which took umbrage at their relegation to middle power status.

But that is not the end of the story. According to New Zealand deputy secretary of external affairs Foss Shanahan, by the fall of 1949 the U.S. State Department had decided that even the FEC was no longer the appropriate body for drawing up a peace treaty. The U.S., he stated, was unwilling to "promote a peace conference in which the United States would have no veto and the British Commonwealth would have the dominant vote, unless the outlines of a settlement had been agreed in advance" (DNZER, p. 292). Indeed, writing to MacArthur in March 1951, Dulles told the General he had been disturbed to read a Reuters news report stating the peace treaty would be considered by the Far Eastern Commission. "Nothing, of course, is farther from my thoughts" (*Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS]*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 902).

As a result, the U.S. appropriated for itself the preparation of the peace treaty and then cajoled and coerced the others into accepting its proposals with, on a number of minor points, only limited amendments. The denouement came at the peace conference itself, where the U.S. proposed rules of procedure that allowed only for statements by governments and no amendments to the U.S.-British draft treaty. As Dean Acheson himself reflected later, "These were severe rules." Despite objections from Canada and Australia, "we were determined to obtain a result and . . . the only rules the Russians would approve would be of a type that might prevent our doing so" (Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, [Norton, 1969], p. 543).

Another key question, however, is why the United States wanted to exclude China. On the surface of course the answer is self-evident-- the Communist Party was now in power and U.S. and Chinese troops were fighting each other in Korea. But Britain also had troops in Korea and yet was prepared to invite the PRC to the conference. According to the U.S. administration at the time, it was actually the Soviet Union that was behind the North Korean attack on the south; yet the U.S. permitted the Soviet Union actively to participate in the conference. What was really behind the exclusion of the PRC was that the U.S. military and Republican Party lobby in the United States had embraced the Guomindang as their cause and accused the Truman administration of having abandoned the struggle against communism, thus losing China as a U.S. ally.

Appointed to bring bipartisan support to the peace treaty effort, Dulles was acutely aware of, and supported the pro-Guomindang lobby in the U.S., although he at times distanced himself from some of its more shrill partisans. At the conference itself, Dulles would disingenuously assert that China's absence from the conference was a matter of deep regret. "China suffered the longest and the deepest from Japanese aggression," he stated, but civil war in China and the "attitudes of the Allied governments" prevented China's participation (U.S. Department of State, *Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Record of Proceedings*, 1951, p. 85). Yet it was Dulles himself who strong-armed the British into dropping their insistence that the PRC be invited (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1110). It was not the "Allies" but the U.S. that refused to recognize the PRC (until Nixon and Kissinger opened relations in 1972) and that insisted on signing a separate peace.

Finally, on the issue of territorial sovereignty, Zhou accurately described the U.S. intention of having Japan relinquish sovereignty over Taiwan but not incorporating any new sovereign into the treaty. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. had sent the Seventh Fleet into the strait between Taiwan and the mainland in order to threaten the PRC. Dulles was in touch with Wellington Koo, the Guomindang's ambassador in Washington, who told him in no uncertain terms that China anticipated reparations from Japan in any peace treaty and, to the astonishment of Dulles, insisted that Formosa should be ceded back to China in the treaty and not be dealt with by the United Nations (*FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 1325). Dulles stated that the U.S. could not agree to this and that the only basis upon which the U.S. had dispatched the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan at the beginning of the Korean War was because it believed the status of Formosa was an international problem to be resolved by the U.N. "Were we to accept the [Nationalist] Chinese point of view our use of the Seventh Fleet would constitute an interference in China's internal problems" (*Ibid.*). Koo stated that the Chinese government could not change its position but assured Dulles that it would not attempt to embarrass the United States.

Thus both the Guomindang and the PRC insisted that for the purposes of the treaty with Japan, Taiwan should be defined as part and parcel of the rest of China, a position both still maintain to this day. In agreeing not to embarrass the U.S., the Guomindang of course demonstrated its dependency on the U.S. and its willingness to subordinate national interests to its quest to remain in power. The SFPT left in its wake not only a divided China, but also numerous other territorial disputes that the U.S. military is only too pleased to use in justifying its continuing presence in the region.

India Rejects the U.S. Invitation

On August 23, 1951, a week after receiving the PRC objections, Dulles was informed by the Indian government that it would refuse to participate in the peace treaty. The telegram was very explicit regarding the reasons for its rejection of the treaty. (1) It considered that the provisions giving the U.S. control of Okinawa and the adjacent Bonin Islands (also known as the Ogasawaras) were not justifiable. (2) The military provisions of the treaty (and the security treaty to be signed with it) should only be concluded after Japan became fully independent. (3) Formosa (Taiwan) should be returned to China at once. And (4) India objected to the fact that the peace treaty deliberations to be held in San Francisco would not allow for negotiation of the treaty. Dulles, Acheson, and Truman

were stunned by the news, since they had anticipated India's participation. The Indian reply provoked Truman to scribble in the margins of the Indian note: "Evidently the ÔGovt' of India has consulted Uncle Joe and Mousie Dung of China!" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 1288-1291).

Numerous commentators have noted India's objections but few have explored the substance of its critique, particularly as it relates to the U.S. takeover of Okinawa. Okinawa was the site of the last major land battle against Japan's imperial forces. On April 1, 1945, U.S. forces landed on Higashi Beach and in northern Okinawa, beginning one of the most horrendous chapters in land warfare in which thousands of U.S. and Japanese troops perished. Okinawan civilians suffered the cruelest fate, with over 100,000 being killed. In the aftermath, U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz proposed that the Army take administrative control of Okinawa and the adjacent islands, and this proposal was accepted by Eisenhower in March 1946. The State Department was not convinced of this arrangement, but in March 1948, MacArthur managed to persuade George Kennan. As a result the National Security Council passed resolution NSC 13/3 in May 1949 effectively separating Okinawa and the Ogasawaras from Japan. As the Cold War escalated, the United States government and military turned Okinawa into a major military center, with major construction beginning in October 1949 with a \$58 million appropriation. In subsequent discussions, the military made it very clear that it wanted absolute control over Okinawa and thus in the SFPT the U.S. left Japan with only an illusory "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa.

The U.S. took advantage of the Potsdam declaration, which stated that after the war Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four main and "such minor islands as we determine." Okinawa was clearly not a minor island like the Ogasawaras, but an old and established center of commerce and trade in the region. However, the U.S. and other Allied powers quickly decided that Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa, declared in the 1870's, was actually the first instance of Japanese imperialist expansion. The Okinawan people had no say in their fate because the U.S. military saw Okinawa as a strategic location from which bombers could reach far into China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. India, only recently free from the bonds of colonial control, quickly and accurately perceived the nature of the U.S. action as a colonial throwback and, more important, publicly acted on its conviction by refusing to attend the San Francisco conference.

The Exclusion of Korea: North and South

In 1951, the United States was at war in Korea and there was never any question of inviting the North Korean regime to the peace conference. However, the United States did want to invite the South Korean regime led by Syngman Rhee in order to bolster its legitimacy and had so indicated to the South Korean government. However, in a last minute reversal, the United States government decided to disinvite the South Koreans. On July 9, Dulles met with the South Korean ambassador to the United States, Yang Yu Chan, to inform him that the South Korean government would not be permitted to be a signatory to the peace treaty since "only those nations in a state of war with Japan and which were signatories of the United Nations Declaration of 1942 would sign the treaty" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI Part 1, pp. 1182-83). Yang was astounded by this news and protested that a division of Korean troops had fought against Japan in China and that the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) had issued a declaration of war. To this, Robert Fearey (State Department Far Eastern Division), replied that the U.S. government had never recognized the KPG, a fact that had not bothered the State Department before. Why had the U.S. reversed its position?

According to Sung-Hwa Cheong, the U.S. changed its view on South Korean participation because the British government had convinced the State Department that its participation would provide a pretext for the Soviet Union to object to the treaty (Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952* [Greenwood Press, 1991], pp. 92-93). This analysis is only partly convincing for several reasons. The idea that only signatories to the 1942 U.N. Declaration would sign the treaty was transparently false. This became vividly clear when the U.S. government decided to permit the newly created French

neocolonial regimes, the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to participate in the conference, despite the fact they were never signatories to the Allied Declaration of 1942 and that many countries had refused to recognize these regimes (DNZER, Vol. III, p. 1110). In fact, Bao Dai, the Emperor and formal head-of-state of Vietnam, had a record of collaboration with the Japanese imperial forces when they occupied Indochina in 1940-41. In light of the trouble the U.S. went to in order to include the French colonial regimes, to which the Soviet Union might equally well object, why was the U.S. suddenly unwilling to go to bat for the South Korean regime? Two other factors might be considered. First, Dulles mistrusted Korean nationalism and worried that South Korean delegates might upset his carefully planned conference by attacking Japanese imperialism. Second, Dulles was determined to exclude Korean nationals in Japan in order not to grant them Allied national status, an issue on which the Yoshida government had insisted.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) did not take the U.S. decision to exclude it lying down, and on July 18, 1951, Yang issued a press statement warning that the Japanese government could not be trusted. In a follow-up meeting with Yang on July 19, Dulles chastised Yang for his remarks to the press. Dulles was well aware that Yang's press statement was no aberration and that ROK president Syngman Rhee could be unpredictable regarding his views on Japan. For example, on January 12, 1951, upon hearing that the U.S. was rearming Japan and hoped to send Japanese troops to fight in Korea, Rhee had said to the press, "On this occasion I declare to the world that we will fight the Japanese before we expel the Chinese" (Cheong, p. 82). As Cheong points out, much of this was populist hyperbole and Rhee in fact was already trying to establish a regional defense pact that would include Japan. Nonetheless, that Rhee resorted to such statements was a reflection of the deep antipathy that many Koreans held towards Japanese imperialism, an antipathy that Rhee might well play to during a peace conference, upsetting the U.S. plans. But there was another related reason for Dulles's reversal.

In replying to Dulles during the July 19 meeting, Yang defended the ROK's right to attend the peace conference by explaining that the Japanese government, still smarting over its loss of Korea, was discriminating against the 800,000 Koreans still residing in Japan (FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1204). To this "Dulles suggested that many of these Koreans were undesirables, being in many cases from North Korea and constituting a center for communist agitation in Japan. He believed, therefore, that probably a legitimate Japanese fear of certain of these Koreans was involved in any action taken against them by the Japanese authorities" (*Ibid.*).

That Dulles should take such a position against the Korean minorities in Japan is not surprising given his previous discussions with Yoshida on this issue. On April 23, 1951, Dulles told Yoshida that he had heard that the Japanese government objected to Korea being a signatory to the treaty. Yoshida responded that "the Government would like to send almost all Koreans in Japan Ōto their homes' because it had long been concerned by their illegal activities" (FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1007). Dulles stated that he could see the wisdom of "Korean nationals in Japan, mostly Communists, . . . not obtain[ing] the property benefits of the treaty."

As a result of this collusion, hundreds of thousands of peoples of Korean descent were excluded from the benefits that other Allied civilians received under the SFPT. Furthermore, the discriminatory meeting of minds between U.S. and Japanese leaders had an immediate impact even prior to the signing of the peace treaty. The Japanese government, either under orders from SCAP or with its approval, issued a number of anti-Korean ordinances forcing all people of Korean descent to register as "aliens," closing Korean-run schools, and adopting a plan to deport all Koreans. As early as 1947, U.S. occupation forces and Japanese police were involved in a number of racist round-ups of Korean nationals, and in one instance two Korean youngsters were killed, a fact never reported because of U.S. censorship during the occupation. The lack of protection for Korean nationals allowed the Yoshida government to announce on April 19, 1952, that all former colonial subjects, of whom 90 percent or more were of Korean descent, would lose their Japanese nationality upon the coming into effect of the SFPT on April 28.

Meanwhile, in Korea, patriotic organizations that supported Rhee organized a mass meeting against the proposed draft peace treaty and demanded that South Korea be allowed to participate. Their appeal fell on deaf ears. As Yukiko Koshiro concluded in her study of race and the occupation, "Thus, Japan was allowed to preserve-- and resume under the Cold War sanction of the United States-- its presumption of superiority over other Asians. Also, Japan's racist wartime ideology, which had propelled atrocities against Asian soldiers and civilians alike, escaped scrutiny and condemnation" (Yukiko Koshiro, *Transpacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* [Columbia University Press, 1999], pp. 112-22, at p. 121).

Reparations and the Philippines

The United States government advocated that Japan should be completely excused from paying any reparations for war damages. According to the February 1951 draft treaties initialed by Dulles's assistant, John Allison (later to become U.S. ambassador to Japan) and Sadao Iguchi, Yoshida's point person in the treaty negotiations, "All parties would waive claims arising out of acts taken during the war prior to September 2, 1945," except that "Allied and Associated Powers" would retain and dispose of Japanese properties within their territories and Japan would restore the property of the Allies and their nationals in Japan (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 852). This proposal was carefully crafted to allow for the disposal of Japanese property in Korea (the term "Associated Power" was inserted to allow Korea to have this right) while in the case of Allied property in Japan, Dulles ensured that Allied nationals would have the right to claim property but that Associated nationals would not, thus excluding the Koreans.

However, the proposal to redeem Allied properties in Japan ran into trouble from an interesting source. Douglas MacArthur strenuously objected to the Allied claim for damage to their properties in Japan. It would, he said, be a morally indefensible position to be exacting monies for this when countries such as the Philippines would receive little in compensation. "It would look as though the United States and England were feathering their own nests at the expense of these other countries" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 865). Ironically, other U.S. military officials also voiced concern regarding compensation for damaged Allied properties since "payment of compensation would not be available for [Japanese] rearmament." Dulles suggested they leave these matters until later.

With the initialed draft treaties tucked safely under his arm, Dulles and his mission headed for the Philippines. There, on February 12, 1951, he met with then president Elpidio Quirino, who indicated an interest in some form of Pacific military pact but who mainly emphasized the Filipino demand for compensation for the estimated eight billion dollars in damage inflicted by the Japanese imperial forces (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 881-82). Quirino argued that rehabilitation had progressed much more rapidly in Japan than in the Philippines and that Japan should therefore contribute to the rebuilding of the Philippine economy. If this were not possible immediately, then perhaps payments might be spread over a number of years.

Knowing that he had already negotiated over and ensured Allied property claims in Japan, and with MacArthur's admonitions still ringing in his ears, Dulles had the temerity to argue with the Filipino representatives that there was no effective way reparations could be paid. Dulles summed up his trip in a personal letter to MacArthur written shortly after he arrived home. He underscored how the Filipinos were preoccupied with reparations and that while the leaders he met seemed to understand the complexities of the issue, there remained "the problem of overcoming the emotional prejudices of the people and explaining to them why the relief to which they have looked forward for so long cannot be had" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 901).

Representatives from the Philippines, even though closely allied with the United States, pressed their case throughout the treaty consultation process. Eventually a reparations clause was included both because of this pressure and because the U.S. feared that without it, MacArthur's admonition about

"feathering Allied nests" would be prophetic. Thus in the final treaty, Article 14 (a) specified:

It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations. Therefore, 1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question.

Again, the clause was cleverly crafted because it relegated reparations to a post-treaty process, thereby undermining the capacity of developing countries such as the Philippines to exact compensation for war damage as part of the price for peace. Furthermore, the article limited claims to states (nationals were not specified) and, most important, reparations were of an in-kind type, allowing Japan to export its goods using Southeast Asian natural resources and thus reestablishing the unequal economic relationship characteristic of prewar times. On the other hand, pressure from the Philippines did force the inclusion of the clause in the first place, allowed for the insertion of the word "presently" in regard to Japan's resources not being sufficient, and expanded the type of reparations beyond just production and salvaging (via the insertion of the phrase "other work").

It should also be noted that Carlos Romulo, the Philippines' secretary of foreign affairs and the head of its delegation at San Francisco, demolished the U.S. argument that Japan lacked the ability to pay for economic reasons. He noted that Japan's economy had recuperated to the point that industrial activity was 32 percent above pre-war levels, that its fiscal position showed a surplus, and its balance of trade had moved into the black. That the Japanese government had much more economic leeway than it or U.S. representatives were willing to admit, and even more than Romulo thought, is confirmed in discussions that took place between finance minister Hayato Ikeda and Joseph Dodge just prior to the peace conference. In their discussion, Ikeda admitted to a budget surplus of over 100 billion yen of which he hoped to return 40 billion to Japanese taxpayers in a rebate (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 1320-23). He was also at this time considering "compensation to Japanese nationals for loss of overseas assets and veterans' allowances." The governor of the Bank of Japan also met with Dodge to try and convince him to accept Japanese gold holdings (estimated at over US\$200 million) because he feared "that the Filipinos might try to attach the gold as reparations" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1337). Before one condemns the Japanese for these unseemly priorities, however, it is important to remember that in discussions over reparations, the U.S. had put payments to its nationals at the front of the queue. To add insult to injury, the U.S. also insisted that its costs during the Occupation (the exclusive nature of which had been at its own insistence), estimated at two billion U.S. dollars, were to come before any other reparations. This was a point that Dulles constantly raised in meetings with other countries.

At the San Francisco conference, despite the intense pressure from the U.S., the Philippine government made a formal reservation in its support of the treaty, declaring it would negotiate a reparations agreement "any provision of the present treaty to the contrary notwithstanding." Indonesia, at this period still having relatively strong ties to the United States government, also advanced an alternative proposal regarding reparations and in the end never ratified the SFPT, concluding a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1958. Burma refused to attend the conference in protest against the lack of reparations.

Resistance in Japan

One of the reasons the Indian government rejected the proposed peace treaty was because the treaty was being tied to a separate military agreement with the United States. Such a military agreement

should only be concluded after Japan had regained its independence, the Indian note to the U.S. suggested. Indeed, the soft peace offered Japan was partially motivated by the U.S. desire to resuscitate Japan's economy even at the expense of the economies of those countries victimized by Japanese imperial aggression. In exchange, however, the U.S. also insisted on a new military arrangement with Japan that would allow it to keep its massive military installations already in Japan. The Indian government correctly perceived that the Japanese government, under the U.S. occupation, was in an unequal relationship and that any military treaty negotiated as part of the peace process would reflect this power imbalance.

However, the power imbalance came only into play in defining the terms of the military arrangement because the Yoshida government had, in fact, already decided to form a military alliance with the U.S. To this end, Yoshida sent a delegation headed by finance minister Ikeda to Washington as early as April 1950, to explore the parameters of a peace treaty to put an end to the Occupation. According to Kiichi Miyazawa, who accompanied Ikeda on the trip and who later became prime minister himself, the main purpose of the Ikeda mission was to transmit Yoshida's view that the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan would be an acceptable price for independence.

On the issue of Japanese rearmament, however, Yoshida was much more equivocal and many accounts of the negotiations between Yoshida and Dulles concentrate on examining to what extent Yoshida resisted Dulles's attempts to impose rearmament on Japan. What has been less well treated are the internal dynamics in Japan that obliged Yoshida to oppose rearmament or at least to hide his acquiescence to it at this time. As the occupation's conservatism increased, symbolized by the massive layoffs in the public sector and an anti-communist witch-hunt that made McCarthyism in the United States look tame, progressive people began to fear that Japan was setting forth on a dangerous road. This was reflected in a major shift within the Japan Socialist Party and within the Japanese labor movement, both of which remained potent forces in Japan despite setbacks in the 1947-49 period.

As early as December 1949, the Japan Socialist Party had adopted an international policy that called for a comprehensive peace based on neutrality for Japan. And at the JSP's January 1951 convention, even before the peace treaty was signed, delegates had voted 342 to 81 against a motion introduced by the veteran conservative social-democrat, Nishio Suehiro, calling for a partial peace treaty and support for Japan's integration into a U.S.-led alliance. Delegates then endorsed the party's four peace principles: a comprehensive peace, neutrality, opposition to foreign bases, and no rearmament. These demands, although controversial because of the Korean war, did resonate with the population at large and heralded the onset of a vigorous peace movement within Japan. Nonetheless, despite extensive opposition, Yoshida proceeded to sign the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty a few hours after initialing the separate peace treaty. Yoshida remarked the next day that Japan had done better as a vanquished nation at San Francisco than it had as one of the victors attending the Versailles conference of 1919.

Yoshida's feelings of euphoria would dissipate somewhat over the next few months as the U.S. got down to brass tacks on two strategic issues-- the terms of the Security Treaty (the "administrative agreement") and China. Because the peace treaty had to be ratified by the U.S. Congress before it would come into force, the State Department attempted to delay ratification in order to strengthen the U.S. bargaining position on these issues (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol VI Part 1, pp. 1352-53). As far as the Administrative Agreement was concerned, the U.S. insisted that (1) it allow for the use of U.S. forces stationed in Japan for forward military operations in the Far East as well as for the defense of Japan; (2) it designate, in case of war, a unified command under the direction of a U.S. supreme commander; (3) it guarantee the U.S. continued access to bases it had held during the occupation and; (4) it give the U.S. extraterritorial control over all its military personnel, including cases where such persons might commit crimes against Japanese civilians while off-duty.

Japanese government representatives tried to dilute the blatant inequality inherent in these demands

but to little avail. Faced with the threat of non-ratification of the peace treaty, the Japanese government agreed to the U.S. demands. There is no doubt that the security treaty as defined by the accompanying administrative agreement was an infringement on Japanese sovereignty. But in acquiescing to the terms of the treaty, the Japanese government was also sacrificing Asian nationalist interests, the real goal of U.S. postwar diplomacy. Not only would there be no reparations for the newly independent countries; they would be threatened from the territory of their erstwhile enemy.

Dulles also used the nine-month veto power the U.S. had during the ratification process to pressure the Yoshida government on the issue of China. The Republican Party faction in Congress was determined to bolster the Guomindang in Taiwan and threatened to stop ratification of the peace treaty unless Japan allied itself with Taiwan. In December 1951, Dulles travelled to Tokyo where he met with Yoshida. Despite a gentlemen's agreement with Britain that Japan would be free to determine its relations between the two Chinese regimes, Dulles forced Yoshida to sign a letter drafted by either himself or his advisers guaranteeing that Japan would recognize the Taiwanese regime and isolate the People's Republic (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 1466-67). When the British government vigorously protested, Dulles lied to the U.S. Secretary of State, suggesting that Yoshida himself had come up with the idea and that Dulles had only encouraged him to put it on paper (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 1467-70). The bill for Republican support of the peace treaty had come due and Dulles was determined that it should be paid in full.

Conclusion

Resistance to the SFPT by certain countries has been discussed before. What is surprising when one reviews the treaty documents and the related literature is the depth and scope of that resistance. Both mainland and Taiwanese China were not even invited to the peace conference. Neither were the Koreans, north and south. India refused to participate in what it regarded as a rigged affair; so did Burma. Three signatories from Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) were actually representatives of the French colonial regime and must be excluded from any bona fide count of Asian countries endorsing the treaty. That leaves only four-- the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Pakistan. Of these four, Indonesia signed the treaty but never ratified it and signed a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1958. The Philippines, although closely allied with the U.S., reserved its signature and did not ratify the treaty until after it had gone into effect. In other words, the only Asian countries that supported the SFPT were Pakistan and Ceylon, both recent colonies of Britain and neither of which had signed the Allied Declaration of 1942.

How, one might ask, was the SFPT able to masquerade as a treaty ending a fifteen-year war in Asia when few, if any, of the victims of Japanese imperialism in Asia really supported it? Part of the answer lies in the accommodation that pro-U.S. leaders, such as Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek, South Korea's Syngman Rhee, and the Philippines' Elpidio Quirino made in order to shore up their own regimes. But as we have seen, their actual role in the peace treaty process was quite limited. More important in the legitimization process was the role played by the forty-five or so other countries that turned up in San Francisco to shout down Soviet objections to the treaty.

Among these other countries there were two key constituencies that provided the support necessary to pass the treaty and give it an international veneer of legitimacy. The first of these were the so called "middle powers," such as Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, which in their search for greater influence opposed the World War II veto given the Soviet Union and China and lent their support to the United States in the Cold War. Whatever differences they had with the U.S. over the peace treaty (e.g., Britain's view that the PRC should have been invited to the peace conference) dissolved in the face of their strategic unity in the Cold War.

The second group of countries were the Latin American states, many of which were neocolonial dependencies of the U.S. On August 24, 1951, just prior to the SFPT, Dulles convened a meeting of all Latin American countries with diplomatic representation in Washington to brief them before the

conference opened in San Francisco. He told those gathered that because of careful preparation much of what might normally be done at a peace conference had already been accomplished. "Now, we are satisfied, it is time to end the negotiations and sign the treaty" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 1291-95). The Russians, he said, would try to delay the signing and engage in "dilatory" tactics but no changes in the treaty would be permitted and the signing would proceed "with or without those countries which may refuse to sign." Dulles concluded the meeting by speaking of the important contribution that all of the Latin American nations had made to winning the war against Japan. At the conference itself, Latin American representatives queued up to shout down Soviet objections to the treaty.

The Yoshida government was not in a strong position in negotiating the peace treaty with the United States. Nonetheless, Yoshida and the Japanese government as a whole made important choices at this time that can only be understood in historical perspective. In 1885, the noted Japanese philosopher, Yukichi Fukuzawa penned a famous essay, entitled "Datsu-a ron," or "Leaving Asia." In it he concluded: "It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West. As for the way of dealing with China and Korea, no special treatment is necessary just because they happen to be our neighbors. We simply follow the manner of the Westerners in knowing how to treat them. Any person who cherishes a bad friend cannot escape his bad notoriety. We simply erase from our minds our bad friends in Asia."

Indeed, before the war Japan did join the Euro-American powers in their imperial scramble in Asia and attempted to outdo them, earning for Japan the enmity of many Asian peoples. But Yoshida and others regarded as Japan's great mistake not its aggression in Asia but rather its alliance with the Axis powers and the ensuing conflict with the Anglo-American bloc: "As I have stated, and history confirms, ever since the opening of Japan's doors to the Western world more than a century ago, the basic principle of Japanese policy has been the maintenance of close and cordial political and economic ties with Great Britain and the United States. That Japan departed from this basic principle, and became allied with Germany and Italy, was the prime cause for my country being pushed headlong into a reckless war" (Yoshida, *Japan's Decisive Century, 1867-1967* [Praeger, 1967], p. 81). Given the Asian countries' resistance to the terms of the peace treaty, Yoshida's accommodation with the U.S. and the European powers in going ahead with SFPT was in effect datsu-a ron (leaving Asia) regenerated. Only this time around, Japan's junior status in the Cold War alliance with the U.S. would be institutionalized.

Of course, in the end there is no way for Japan to leave Asia-- it was simply redefining the terms of its re-entry into the region. It did not, as one might expect, re-enter with remorse and restitution but neither did it re-enter immediately in a military role. Rather it capitalized on U.S. imperial ambitions in Asia. Nobel laureate Kenzaburo Oe confronted and reflected on this legacy: "The Japanese have not reflected on the meaning of the defeat seriously. In short, we should have negated the entire modernization project and sought a completely new direction, but we didn't. Japan as an Asian nation did not think of coexisting with other nations in Asia but again tried to outrun all the others. For example, Japan harvested a huge profit from the Korean War" (Oe, in *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1997: 292) Having escaped serious reparations, Japan was able to capitalize economically on the militarization of the Pacific.

However one assesses Japan's postwar role, the SFPT was not really its creation but rather the product of the U.S.'s complex machinations as it enhanced its Pacific profile. At the time, John Foster Dulles spoke for many in the United States when he responded to Rene Massigli, the French ambassador in London, who had suggested that the peace treaty be delayed in order to minimize tensions with the Soviet Union. Dulles stated in a telegram summarizing this meeting: "I referred to the preponderant role played by the U.S. in winning Japanese war and conducting occupation and said in fact that in my opinion U.S. wld not now publicly take a cowardly role in Japan which wld almost surely lose all we have struggled for past ten years" (*FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 1104).

The result of the U.S. role in the occupation and in controlling the treaty process has been described by John Dower in his recent book, *Embracing Defeat*: "One of the most pernicious aspects of the occupation was that the Asian peoples who had suffered most from imperial Japan's depredations-- the Chinese, Koreans, Indonesians, and Filipinos had no serious role, no influential presence at all in the defeated land. They became invisible. Asian contributions to defeating the emperor's soldiers and sailors were displaced by an all-consuming focus on the American victory in the Pacific War" (p. 27). The peripheralization of Asia in the SFPT therefore was no coincidence. It reflected the U.S.'s appropriation of the pan-Asian fight against Japanese imperialism as well as its determination to project its imperial values in the region. Japan would be its adjutant, a role for which Yoshida carefully fought. This required that the U.S. government fully nurture Japan's dual identity -- aligning it with the West and alienating it from Asia. Behind this manipulation also lay a deep-seated fear of Asian nationalism that was expressed through the demonization of communism.

In the end the San Francisco agreement was only peripherally a peace treaty-- it was a series of bi- and multi-lateral military pacts that ensured the Pacific would become an American lake, an ambition that dates from the early 20th century. The U.S. would retain over 200,000 troops in Japan alone, not to mention thousands more in Okinawa, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and, as the decade continued, in Vietnam as well. As Chalmers Johnson concluded in his recent work, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*: "In the course of the Cold War, the USSR intervened militarily to hold its empire together in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The United States intervened militarily to hold its empire together in Korea and Vietnam (where it killed a great many more people in losing than the USSR did in its two successful interventions)" (p. 21).

Just as the SFPT provoked resistance among Asian countries, so too did the subsequent militarization of the region prompt ongoing resistance-- the anti-base movements in South Korea, the Philippines, and Okinawa; the fight for neutralism in Japan; the non-aligned movement led by India and Indonesia; the armed resistance in Vietnam and other countries. While the region was devastated by these military tragedies, including the Cambodian nightmare, it has re-emerged and begun to take its rightful place in the world. And, as the threat of superpower confrontation has declined, a vigorous movement for democracy has emerged that is finally allowing the long-suppressed voices of the past to make themselves heard.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Women%27s_Fund

Asian Women's Fund

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Asian Women's Fund (財団法人女性のためのアジア平和国民基金 *zaidan hojin josei-no tame no Ajia heiwa kokumin kikin*^[1]), also abbreviated to アジア女性基金 in Japanese, was a fund set up by the Japanese government in 1994 to distribute compensation to **comfort women** in South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Indonesia.^[1] Each survivor was provided with a signed apology from the prime minister, stating "As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women."^[2] The fund was dissolved on March 31, 2007.^[3]

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Background

On the **Japanese general election** on July 18, 1993, the **Liberal Democratic Party** lost government for the first time since 1955. **Tomiichi Murayama** became Prime Minister on June 30, 1994, and in 1995 the fund, tentatively named "Josei no Tamenno Ajia Heiwa Yuko Kikin (the Asian Peace and Friendship Foundation for Women). As expressed by Murayama at a press conference on July 18, 1995^[4] the government's role in the fund was defined as following:

- The Fund would call for donations from a wide spectrum of Japanese society as a way to enact the Japanese people's atonement for the former comfort women;
- The Fund would support those conducting medical and welfare projects and other similar projects which were of service to former comfort women, through the use of government funding and other funds;
- When these projects were implemented, the Government would express the nation's feelings of sincere remorse and apology to the former comfort women; and
- The Government would collate historical documents relating to the comfort women, to serve as a lesson of history. The Chief Cabinet Secretary also clearly stated that the Fund would, through the use of government and other funds, support those who undertook projects aimed at resolving contemporary problems, such as violence against women.^[1]

History

The fund was formally established on June 19, 1995. The first president was [Bunbei Hara](#).^[5] The fund was set up by the Japanese government and run with state funds, and it was under the direct supervision of the [Cabinet](#) and the [Ministry of Foreign Affairs](#). It was a quasi public organization, but it was managed by volunteers who were private citizens. South Korea claimed that state redress was what was required, and that the fund was not state redress.^[2]

No activities in China or North Korea were funded. The Chinese and Japanese governments were unable to reach any agreement, and Japan had no regular diplomatic relations with North Korea.

On January 24, 2005 a press conference was held announcing that the fund's would wrap up in March 2007 after the Indonesian projects were completed. On March 6, 2007 a press conference was held and president of the fund [Tomiichi Murayama](#) announced that the fund would dissolve on March 31, 2007.

Japanese right-wing objections

Some Japanese right-wingers objected to the fund on the basis that it was attempting to solve a "non-existent problem".^{[2][6][7]} The conservative [Yomiuri newspaper](#) said in an editorial in 2011 "No written material supporting the claim that government and military authorities were involved in the forcible and systematic recruitment of comfort women has been discovered", and that it regarded the fund as a failure based on a misunderstanding of history.^[8]

South Korea's objections to the fund

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Financial payments

- ¥565m (\$4.7m) was raised in donations from the Japanese people, and given to 285 comfort women from Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, each of whom received about 2m yen (\$16,700)
- ¥770m (\$6.5m) in taxpayers' money was provided to pay for medical fees for these women, and for 79 other women from the Netherlands
- ¥370 million (\$3.1m) was spent building medical facilities and old peoples' homes in Indonesia, rather than compensating individuals there, and the rest was used for the fund's running costs and other smaller projects.^[6]